COMMUNICATION IN PINDAR'S DEICTIC ACTS

ANNA BONIFAZI

Epinician performance, like every communicative act, relies on general conditions that allow it to work, to be successful.[1] In the first place, communication is intentional; without intentionality there is no communication.[2] Its two modalities are linguistic and extralinguistic;[3] paralinguistic features can modify both linguistic and extralinguistic acts.[4] Furthermore, communicative activity involves all participants; meaning is constructed within their relationship.[5] With their inferential activity, the participants activate a cognitive comprehension of signals, either through an extralinguistic or a linguistic

1 From Bara's work *Pragmatica Cognitiva* (1999), a basic source for my theoretical point of view.

2 For the first (rather famous) formulation of intentionality in communication, see Grice 1957.385–88. "'A meant something by x' is (roughly) equivalent to 'A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention'" (Grice 1957.385).

3 For example, an e-mail is comprehended linguistically, a smile extralinguistically, a chat face to face (as words + gestures + body's movements) in both ways. Understanding communicative acts usually includes both modalities at the same time. That is, there is no reciprocal exclusion; only the proportions can vary. For example: if I give a hug to my child saying "You are my sweetie," the child comprehends the communication mostly extralinguistically; conversely, if I am listening on the radio to a speech of President Bush to the nation, my comprehension of the communication is mostly linguistic.

4 Going back to the examples in note 3 above, paralinguistic features are asterisks in e-mail, a smile through gritted teeth, a pause between two words in a chat. Cf. Bara 1999.27–29.

5 "La comunicazione umana è generata insieme da tutte le persone che partecipano all'interazione, e non esiste significato al di fuori di quello costruito all'interno della loro relazione" (Bara 1999.21). The underlying communicative model is meant to be bidirectional: instead of a one-way transmission of meanings from the speaker to the addressee, here the reciprocal contribution of the participants to the construction of meaning is taken into account. Cf. Bakhtin 1981 and Voloshinov 1973.86–87.

Arethusa 37 (2004) 391–414 © 2004 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

medium.[6] Pragmatics is the study of this inferential activity that is oriented toward the non-explicit elements of linguistic communication;[7] it aims to explain and classify inferences required by communicative linguistic activity.

Readers of or listeners to a literary text[8] experience comprehension as a linguistic processing of explicit as well as implicit meanings in the text. The interaction between who composes (or composed) and who enjoys a literary text can be understood in terms of the co-production of meaning.[9] Whatever the conditions of reception—subjective or intersubjective—and whatever the spatial and/or temporal distance between the literary object and its recipients, a literary text is a communicative act. The interactive relationship between what the text communicates and what is understood as being communicated conforms to the general conditions of communication outlined above. In the case of Pindaric texts, how do these principles operate differently for twenty-first-century recipients and for the original audiences?

PINDARIC EPINICIAN COMMUNICATION

From the point of view of the original listeners, Pindaric epinician communication—through the performance[10] —was processed both linguistically and extralinguistically. In other words, it included both the realization and the comprehension of the song at these two complementary levels. Two kinds of external data enabled extralinguistic processing: 1) external text realization (rhythm, music, dance, gestures), and 2) external occasional or

---

6 Some examples: a thumbs up, a purely extralinguistic act, is a signal of "OK"; a road sign drawing of a deer is a warning signal that a deer may cross the road; a linguistic act like the exclamation "Oops!" is a signal of embarrassment; a road sign "Detour" is a signal about a change of direction.

7 Presuppositions and implicatures, as kinds of inferences, are topics of "historical" pragmatics (cf. Stalnaker 1974 and Grice 1975, respectively). Verschueren collects these features under the general category of "implicit meaning" (Verschueren 1999.25–36).

8 "Text" is defined by its general properties of recognizability independently of its status (written or oral, in prose or in poetry, literary or conversational). See the list of properties of "real texts" in Emmott 1997.75.

9 See, for example, the significant contribution of the Constance school concerning "Reception Theory" (cf. Iser 1976 and Jauss 1977) and, from the semiotic point of view, Eco 1979.

10 Bauman describes performance in general as "a way of speaking, the essence of which resides in the assumption of responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative skill, highlighting the way in which communication is carried out, above and beyond its referential content" (Bauman 1986.3). On the cultural "extralinguistic" meanings of an oral performance in archaic Greece, see Havelock 1963.

situational circumstances (the place, the moment, the kind of feast, the official vs. private range of listeners)—that is the extralinguistic context. Linguistic processing, on the other hand, arose from the literal and non-literal meanings of the words, the latter coinciding with what the words implicitly conveyed. Both linguistic and extralinguistic comprehension resulted in inferences, i.e., the cognitive elaboration of signals (stimuli).[11] In principle, these signals were either conventional (defined culturally) or non-conventional (defined individually). A conventional signal linguistically processed was, for example, the utterance "here" in its basic reference: "close to an 'I'"; a non-conventional one was the same "here" in a possible personalized connotation, as, for example, "I participate in this 'here.'"[12] A conventional signal extralinguistically processed was, for example, the melodic pattern; a non-conventional signal was the subjective effect of that particular melodic pattern. In the epinician reception by original listeners of the first and, possibly, subsequent performances of the texts, all these comprehension elements were operative.

At which level can we (as Greek scholars who study Pindaric texts) access these elements of comprehension? Which ones are somehow lost to us? We have to remember at each moment of our reading that we have in our hands just the transcription of the linguistic part of a more complex communicative operation. We can only discuss the conventional signals belonging to the verbal code. If our task is to reconstruct the source of the power of Pindaric words, our only basis is the linguistic comprehension of words and their usage. Our reception is completely missing the extralinguistic realization of the text. The only extralinguistic help for scholars is occasional information about the circumstances of performance, information that is itself just a series of suppositions from either indirect sources or textual inferences.

Even concerning word usage, the gap separating us from the "then and there" reception of the poems causes several interpretive difficulties. Word usage is investigated by textual pragmatics, and the most relevant

---

11 I apply the notion of signals to both linguistic and extralinguistic communication; Bara 1999.37–39 focuses on conventional and non-conventional signals within extralinguistic communication.

12 At the linguistic level, Grice distinguished between "conventional implicatures" (analogous to inferences connected with conventional signals in our explanation) and "conversational implicatures" (analogous to inferences connected with non-conventional signals in our explanation). See Grice 1975.43–45.

characteristics of epinician performances as communicative acts require a pragmatic analysis. We see a written text, but we are forced to figure out completely different communicative modalities. For example, we know that epinician odes were SONGS (in Nagy's pregnant meaning[13]), and yet what remains is only the verbal and metrical part. In addition, there is an overlap in the performer(s) between roles, identifications, and sources of the utterance—a phenomenon known as the "programmatic praxis of the mask" (cf. Pagnini 1980.23). Yet we read ambiguously "I" or "we." Finally, we know that praising words were intended to be a complete act, an event, in a ritual sense (cf. Gentili 1969 and 1984); yet our usual reception is fragmentary, linked to single (erudite) terms. These three characteristics—the poems' status as SONG, the overlapping roles of the speaker(s), and praise utterances as event—correspond to three pragmatic features: informational word order,[14] deixis, and speech-acts.[15]

Pindaric deixis is a pragmatic feature that shows our separation from the original reception in a particularly powerful way. Nevertheless, we can draw closer to the pragmatic value of deixis if we consider epinician deictic expressions in the light of the general principles proposed by Bara (1999.69ff.). These include, in addition to intentionality and linguistic and extralinguistic functional systems, attention, (shared) beliefs, (shared) knowledge, symbolicity, and cultural dependence.

A CLASSIFICATION OF EPINICIAN DEIXIS

Deictic utterances represent the grammaticalization of references either to the extra-text or to the text itself. With respect to the text as a "geographical" starting point, we will consider exophoric as well as endophoric uses of deictic expressions.[16]

---

13 Nagy 1990.33ff. SONG is set apart from *poetry* as marked by music, rhythm, and dance. I use capital letters as in Nagy.

14 S. Dik 1981 provides a theoretical model for some important treatments of word order in Greek prose. See also H. Dik 1995 on word order in Herodotus and Bakker 1997b on informational units in Homer. An indirect source for future study of lyric word order and its pragmatic reasons is Devine and Stephens 2000.

15 Verschueren 1999.191 reviews the different (historical) speech-act classifications and identifies a larger category called "linguistic action verbs." An application to Pindaric "I"-sentences of Austin's original assumptions about "explicit performatives" (Austin 1962) is to be found in Bonifazi 2000.

16 On exophoric and endophoric, see Halliday and Hasan 1976.57–76.

The utterance situation is certainly a crucial element for deictic comprehension,[17] but not the only one. If I telephone my husband, saying "I'm here," and he does not recognize my voice, does not know to which "here" I refer, does not guess what I want to convey with that sentence, or a combination of the three, my communicative act has failed. The identification of the right place indicated by "here"—knowing where the wife is speaking from—is not enough for the husband to fully understand the message. My utterance may express proximity to myself ("I reached my destination, you know"), or proximity to my husband ("I have arrived. I am close"), or even an indirect speech-act ("I have arrived. Come and pick me up").

Other factors that influence deictic understanding include the different kinds of knowledge shared by the participants in the act of communication. In order to clarify those at stake during a Pindaric performance, I adopt Bara's psycho-cognitive distinction between individual, common, and shared beliefs.[18] Individual beliefs are subjective; they belong to individuals. Common beliefs belong to a single cultural community and not to other cultural communities. Shared beliefs are consciously common, and communication participants are aware of them as common (Bara 1999.90). Inferences are drawn purely from "the space of shared beliefs" between the participants (Bara 1999.93). In the case of Pindaric epinician utterances, we have to consider a large number of shared beliefs as an implicit starting point.

The various kinds of shared knowledge that deictic expressions imply motivate us to go not only beyond the situational data, but also beyond the identification of definite referents as the only purpose of such expressions.[19] In Pindar, continuous oscillation between external and internal reference, new information presented and old information reactivated, and real and imaginative deixis show how the poet exploits different pragmatic deictic properties in order to make his poetry strongly involving.

---

17 On exophoric use: a sentence such as "Give me that" is unintelligible without seeing what is literally pointed at.

18 Following Hintikka 1962, he assumes "belief" as a primitive mental status and "knowledge" as a derived concept, "vale a dire una sorta di abbreviazione per credenza vera rispetto al mondo (*true belief*)" (Bara 1999.87, italics in the text). However, in literature pragmatics, shared beliefs correspond to shared knowledge, as Bara himself indicates.

19 Speaking generally of place deixis, Fuchs 1993.16 states: "What actually determines the references is relevant relations in the shared-knowledge contexts addressed."

Deictic utterances in Pindar correspond to two intentions and two kinds of acts by the speaker. C. Lyons distinguishes between "ostension" ("expressions which direct the hearer's attention towards a referent") and proper deixis, which expresses "closeness or association with some centre" (Lyons 1999.160). Each deictic feature conveys a basic orienting intention, corresponding to the speech-act of indicating a referent, as well as an arranging or localizing intention, corresponding to the act of giving a place (in space or in time) to that referent.

The following classification of Pindaric uses of person and place deixis borrows categories from the pragmatic uses of demonstratives proposed in Himmelmann 1996 and Diessel 1999.[20] There is a basic distinction between exophoric and endophoric uses; exophoric uses, in turn, can be divided into gestural (either ocular or *am Phantasma*)[21] and symbolic.[22] Endophoric uses can be divided into anaphoric, discourse deictic, and recognitional.

Quintessential or "pure" deictics are *exophoric*, "the basic use from which all other uses derive."[23] In Pindar, too, exophoric deictics refer to something/somebody that is outside of the speech and, at the same time, anchored to the speech situation. They orient toward something known by the listeners to be present to the speech situation; only the arranging (localizing) act is new: the object x is pointed to out "there," or "way over there," or "close to you," and so on.

Exophoric gestural ocular deixis indicates what is related to the extralinguistic realization of the text; it can be exemplified by ὅδε (the most representative demonstrative of this subcategory), usually as an adjective,[24] as in *Pythian* 2.3–4: τόδε . . . φέρων / μέλος ἔρχομαι, "I come . . . bearing this song."[25] The arranging (localizing) act conveyed by ὅδε consists of

---

20 The pragmatic function of demonstratives is "to orient the hearer in the speech situation, focusing his or her attention on objects of interest" (Diessel 1999.152).

21 The important categories established by Bühler 1965 [1934]: *Demonstratio ad oculos*, *Deixis am Phantasma,* and Anaphora are analyzed following Diessel: *Demonstratio ad oculos* and *Deixis am Phantasma* correspond to exophoric uses; Anaphora is (just) one of the possible endophoric uses. On *Deixis am Phantasma* as exophoric, see Diessel 1999.95.

22 About the distinction between "gestural" and "symbolic," cf. Diessel 1999.94, Fillmore 1997.62–63, Levinson 1983.65–66.

23 Cf. Diessel 1999.93 and, for the literature for and against this basic assumption, 110.

24 Demonstratives that are most frequently used exophorically are in adjectival form, those most frequently used endophorically are in pronominal form (see below, note 47).

25 All translations are by Race 1997. Pindar's texts are quoted from Snell and Mähler 1987.

linking the performance or performance surroundings to the "I"-sphere.[26] In general, however, the localizing function of person deixis ("I," "we," "you") and exophoric place/time deixis is problematic when we consider their following pragmatic properties: replaceability and extension (as in Fuchs 1993). Replaceability of person and place deictics allows the possibility of deictic shifts from one *origo*, or starting point of utterance, to another during a narrative or an ongoing discourse.[27] Moreover, "I" and "you," like "here" and "now," hide a possible extension, namely the inclusion of more persons or places depending on the relevance of the information being conveyed at the moment of their utterance.[28] The function of person or place deixis is "to indicate the 'given' position or any dimension of localization that may be relevant at the moment."[29] Thus the interpretation of every "I" or "you," "here" or "there" utterance in a Pindaric performance has to take into account these pragmatic properties. The meaning of these utterances is flexible: it can be related to different foregrounded situations (conventionally or, occasionally, publicly or privately conveyed).

Pindar's "I," which belongs to exophoric gestural ocular deixis, is a good example of this flexible meaning. The huge literature on this topic indirectly proves that replaceability and extension play a big role in the

---

26 In metaphoric or metonymic expressions about the song: *Py.* 2.67, *Ne.* 4.15 and 44, *Is.* 2.45, *Is.* 4.21, *Ne.* 3.76, *Py.* 10.65, *Py.* 12.5; in relation to presumed spectators (groups, communities, victors) or sites of the performance: *Ol.* 2.36, *Ol.* 6.102, *Ne.* 8.14, *Ol.* 4.9, *Ol.* 8.10, *Ol.* 14.16, *Py.* 5.22, *Ol.* 5.14, *Ol.* 13.27, *Is.* 5.22, *Is.* 6.65, *Ol.* 5.20, *Py.* 8.99, *Py.* 9.91, *Ol.* 9.110, *Ne.* 2.3, *Is.* 1.34, *Is.* 4.70, *Ne.* 3.68, *Ne.* 6.46, *Is.* 6.21, *Ol.* 8.25, *Ne.* 7.83.

27 This happens in ordinary speech whenever a speaker introduces direct speech, for example: "And he said: 'I am not surprised.'" In Pindaric myth, direct speeches activating deictic shifts exploit the same basic pragmatic property of replaceability.

28 Fuchs 1993.18–20 notes how much the communicative relevance of an utterance like "here" can differ from simple localization, as in "(in a bar) It's impossible to talk *here*, let's go somewhere quieter," where "here" conveys noisiness as relevant information about the place, instead of the interlocutor's location, which is self-evident. "Spatial expressions are all too often construed as if their main if not sole use were in answering 'where' questions" (Fuchs 1993.20).

29 Fuchs 1993.18. "Just as 'places' are defined by social and/or ad-hoc relevances, not 'physically' (and that is true even for definitions in 'physical' terms), 'times' are delimited on the basis of relevant events, relevant change . . . Depending on ad-hoc relevances, we use many different dimensions of localization for referring to what looks like one and the same physical location; and different, thematically-defined 'time-lines,' each with its specific delimitations, determine the extension of any 'present' or 'now'" (Fuchs 1993.22). For definitions of the meaning of "I" or "here" utterances, and on the extension problem, see Fuchs 1993.11–33.

difficulty of identifying a unique referent for the "I." From a theoretical linguistic perspective, the Pindaric "I," far from simply indicating the speaker, consciously exploits different possible extensions.[30] Every "I"-deixis conveys overlapping meanings that depend on which ones are relevant at the precise moment of its utterance. Therefore the "I" is not always collective, nor always the projection of the traditional singer, nor does it always refer to a known individual. The "I" points to the professional and traditional role of the performer; it points to the source of Pindaric words, and it indicates a community in various, not mutually exclusive, combinations. As a replaceable element, the "I" cannot ontologically mark the soloist or choralist modalities of the performance. Because of their pragmatic nature, deictic features do not bear any practical (referential) information about numbers or names of the performers.[31] Furthermore, from the pragmatic point of view, the "I" is never fictive. Its oscillation between ocular and *am Phantasma* use does not cancel the fact that it is exophoric: its anchorage to the real performance situation is a permanent fact that makes each "I" utterance a means for realizing a successful communication.

The concept of extension is valid not only for person deixis but also for place and time demonstratives, since ὅδε and οὗτος as adjectives also show an ambiguous extension of their respective scopes, classically that of the "I" (ὅδε) and that of the "you" (οὗτος). A representative case is the quasi-formulaic τόνδε κῶμον ("this revel"; cf. *Ol.* 4.9, *Ol.* 8.10, *Ol.* 14.19, *Py.* 5.22). According to Morgan 1993.2–9, this is an effective appropriation (by the poet, of course) of the κῶμος reality, a (rhetorical) inclusion of the κῶμος within the "I"- sphere, rather than a localization of the festive procession in a definite place near to the "I." Given the possibility of extending the "I," this deictic utterance provides little objective information about either the inclusion of the comiasts among the performers (thus a choral hypothesis) or their exclusion (thus a soloist hypothesis; cf. Bonifazi

30 For "I" occurrences, their pragmatic implications and bibliography on different points of view, see Bonifazi 2001.35–37, 92–95, 195–96, 212–13.

31 The only conceivable pragmatic distinction could be the following: either "I" is unmarked or (the opposite) "we" is marked—not with respect to the "I" identity but with respect to the included audience, that is, "we" includes both the speaker (whoever he is) *and* the audience. Cf. Bonifazi 2001.106, 153–54, 212–13. Kurke 1991.139 n. 7 hints at the same interpretation. Also, Lardinois 1996.161 defines "we" as marked and "I" as unmarked in archaic poetry; he understands a first-person plural as referring "to a chorus or a soloist who wants to include others."

2001.41). The information "near to 'I'" achieves all communicative purposes except referential identification of the performer(s). Another example of extension is *Olympian* 11.7–8:

> ἀφθόνητος δ' αἶνος Ὀλυμπιονίκαις
> οὗτος ἄγκειται.
>
> Without stint is that praise dedicated to
> Olympic victors.

Here, although there is no "you" reference, the αἶνος is perceivable, like a votive offering (cf. ἀνάκειμαι). It is presented from the point of view of a "you," probably the "you" par excellence: those who are in front of the speaker, i.e., the audience. The choice of a "you" point of view is important, even without a definite localization of that "you."

Gestural am Phantasma deixis refers to an imaginative reality. This can imply a shift from the real performance setting to another (imaginative) site, but all evoked persons and events are equally indicated as physically present through the vividness of the uttered words.[32] That is why it is not so easy to determine with certainty what is *am Phantasma* and what is ocular. Let us consider, for example, *Isthmian* 6.19: ὔμμε τ', ὦ χρυσάρματοι Αἰακίδαι, "And as for you, O Aiakidai with your golden chariots . . ." At this moment of the performance before the mythical section begins, the poet chooses a "you"-deixis, presumably pointing to a physical presence, but it is not clear which kind of physical presence. At least three possibilities are to be considered: an *am Phantasma* reference to the Aeginetan ancestors, an ocular reference to some artistic representation of the Aeacids, or an ocular reference to the Aeginetan clan, metaphorically indicated by the address to their ancestors.

All "you"-deixis related to the victor[33] is fundamentally ambiguous. While it is natural to assume the physical presence of the victor at the

---

32 J. Lyons 1977.579 speaks of deictic projection-meaning. On the three different kinds of shift (*Versetzung*) within *Deixis am Phantasma*, see Bühler 1965 [1934].121–40. Applications of Bühler's shifts to Pindaric poetry are discussed in Bonifazi 2001.43–49. On the so-called "Deixis Shift Theory," see Segal 1995.14–16. Felson's 1999 analysis of *Py.* 4 shows how the Pindaric "deictic shifts" technique works as a strategy to involve the audience.

33 Cf. *Ol.* 1.107, *Py.* 3.80, *Py.* 6.15, *Ol.* 5.23, *Ol.* 6.12 and 77, *Ol.* 10.92, *Ol.* 11.12, *Ne.* 6.60, *Py.* 4.250, *Py.* 5.5, *Py.* 7.17, *Ne.* 2.14, *Is.* 4.2, *Is.* 5.18.

performance, maybe in the front row, we cannot be sure about that. The "you" may also represent the basic symbolic relationship "I"-*laudator*, "you"-*laudandus* (cf. Bremer 1990.43), and the direct address is effective in involving the victor, through both an *am Phantasma* indication (that is, without the presence of the victor on the spot), and ocular deixis.

Exophoric symbolic deixis simply includes all exophoric deictic features whose comprehension needs shared knowledge other than the ocular. It refers to entities whose spatio-temporal location is perceived from an enlarged point of view, culturally rather than physically shared. Symbolic deictics are demonstratives that relate to a larger situational context. For example, an expression like "This year is running out" conveys a common, intersubjective perceptive experience of "this year" instead of an ocular deixis. In epinician odes, this category is represented, for example, by ἐνθάδε for "on the earth," i.e., "in the mortal world" (cf. *Ol.* 2.57 and frag. 129.2).

Symbolic use of deixis is not to be confused with *am Phantasma* use. Both are imaginative, but, in the former, referents are previously known and gestures are not needed; conversely, in the latter, referents are indicated "on the spot," gesturally.

What do exo- and endo-indexicals have in common from the cognitive point of view? First, although the sources for interpreting their referents differ (the context of the utterance for the former, the co-text for the latter[34]), in both cases, the listener or reader constructs discourse-relevant mental representations.[35] Second, deixis (originally exophoric) and anaphora (prototypically endophoric) do not have an either/or status but constitute "a 'cline' or continuum on the plane of indexicality, since it is perfectly possible for a given indexical expression to express both functions simultaneously" (Cornish 1999.32).

These theoretical assumptions allow us to explain the cognitive-pragmatic effects of Pindaric deictic features. Indeed, mental representations are the basic result of deictic inferential activity, both exophoric and

---

34 The co-text of a given discourse or text fragment comprises all related (linguistic) portions of the whole discourse or text.

35 "What unites the two alleged subtypes [endophora and exophora] . . . carries greater theoretical weight than what divides them: the fact that both presuppose the prior existence of a salient discourse representation of their referent at the point of use . . . the text via prior mention and the situation via direct, mutual perception on the part of the interlocutors" (Cornish 1999.116–17).

endophoric. Furthermore, Pindar's style does not seek univocal indications, either/or indexicals; rather, it privileges hybrid, ambiguous, and polysemantic deictic features.

Discourse deixis offers the clearest example of the coexistence of exo- and endo-references in the Pindaric odes. They provide "a thematic link between two propositions (or speech acts) at one particular point in the progressing discourse" (Diessel 1999.102). Deictic expressions that precede or follow segments of the poetic discourse are related to both the co-text and the uttering act, as textual *and* discourse deixis.[36] The reason is simple: the linguistic realization of the text is inseparable from its utterance, its performance.[37] Every reference to the words of the text can be interpreted both internally (as purely endophoric) and externally (as exophoric). But if we consider the listening dimension in the audience's reception, the "external" link—"that you just heard" or "listen here!"—turns out to be more relevant because it activates the audience's perceptive faculty.[38] It is possible to speak of *demonstratio ad aures*, that is, deixis oriented to a exophoric gestural use. The metatextual function of discourse deictics does not contradict this usage, it even reinforces it. Thus metatextuality serves the autoreferentiality of the song and a crucial communicative purpose: to center the audience's attention onto the *origo* of the utterance and its authoritative power. As an adjective or a pronoun, οὗτος is typically specialized in this use; it is often explicitly linked to *verba dicendi:* introductions or endings of direct speeches, announced performer's speech-acts, and performance metaphors.[39] Also ὅδε, in its few endophoric uses, works as a discourse deictic.[40]

---

36 Cf. Diessel 1999.101 and Cornish 1999.32. In J. Lyons 1977.668, textual deixis is called "pure textual deixis" and discourse deixis is called "impure textual deixis." The latter, unlike the former, refers to the speech-act of saying something instead of referring to single words. For example, if a speaker says "Tom is sleeping" and his interlocutor replies "That's a lie," "that" is discourse deixis. Conversely, if the speaker says "What about a holiday?" and his interlocutor replies "Oh! I love that word," "that" is textual deixis.

37 Cf. Danielewicz 2001.50: "The metatextual frame of the hymn with its deictic expressions refers also to the situation of performance."

38 The "internal" link "see above" or "see below" is familiar in our reading reception but alien to "then and there" listening reception.

39 Cf. *Ol.* 3.7, *Ol.* 6.20 and 26, *Ol.* 8.57, *Ol.* 9.25, 36, and 108, *Ol.* 11.8, *Py.* 2.21, *Py.* 3.2, *Py.* 4.59, 116, 163, 168, and 288, *Py.* 5.124, *Py.* 9.43, *Ne.* 3.52, *Ne.* 6.28 and 58, *Ne.* 7.63, *Ne.* 10.11, *Is.* 2.47, *Is.* 4.40, *Is.* 6.49 and 67. Slater translates the most frequent use of οὗτος as "this, that I have just mentioned" (Slater 1969a.400). My exophoric interpretation of οὗτος as a discourse deictic finds validation in Bakker's remarks about οὗτος in Homer. He

Anaphoric demonstratives are quintessentially *endophoric* in that they "track participants of the preceding discourse" (Diessel 1999.96). Likewise *cataphoric* demonstratives track participants of the subsequent discourse.[41] According to Cornish, the referents of anaphoric expressions in a discourse or text are mentally represented. "These referents are ranked in terms of their current saliency or topicality, and are located in different regions of working memory according to their current levels of activation."[42]

Pindaric cataphoric ὅδε, anaphoric/cataphoric οὗτος, anaphoric/cataphoric κεῖνος, and anaphoric αὐτός[43] all activate memory structures; they do not simply refer to close or far nouns. In fact, their cognitive-pragmatic function is to present the understander with persons, objects, and events as a new focus of attention.[44] This, in my opinion, differentiates these demonstrative third-person pronouns from other non-demonstrative ones, like νιν and σφε.[45] Pindar uses οὗτος, κεῖνος, and αὐτός to signal a focus priority: they isolate one entity (among others that are present) and allow it to be mentally "managed" according to "different attentional statuses" (Cornish 1999.255). An example is *Pythian* 12.5–6:

---

underscores its use in speeches rather than in narratives and connects its "exclusively deictic" value to words re-performed: "It pulls that speech into the present, while at the same time characterizing the song of the present as just as good as the song of the past" (Bakker 1999a.6 and 13, respectively).

40 Usually ὅδε is exophoric. Its only endophoric uses are cataphoric, specifically as a discourse deictic (*Py.* 4.86 and 277, *Ne.* 10.80 and 82, *Ne.* 7.50. Cf. Slater 1969a s.v., b. "prospective, pointing to what follows"). In those cases, too, anaphora and exophora overlap.

41 In J. Lyons 1977.659, anaphora "covers both normal backward-looking anaphoric reference and the less normal forward-looking or anticipatory reference." I use anaphora and cataphora only to distinguish the position of the referent (before or after their co-reference), but the pragmatic use of both of them is supposed to be endophoric anaphoric.

42 Cf. Cornish 1999.255. According to Emmott 1997, the reader reconstructs the narrative context by "priming" involved but not mentioned persons, or by "focusing" their presence and their acts through personal or demonstrative pronouns.

43 On cataphoric ("prospective") occurrences of ὅδε and οὗτος, see Slater 1969a s.v. b. and 2, respectively; on cataphoric κεῖνος, see below pp. 407–08.

44 "Demonstrative pronouns and descriptions may also be used to signal transitions to new discourse units, by picking up referents which were the focus of attention in the immediately preceding discourse segment but which are about to be displaced by a new object of focus" (Cornish 1999.27). Diessel draws a similar conclusion: "What all anaphoric demonstratives have in common is that they do not just continue the focus of attention; rather, they indicate that the antecedent is not the referent that the hearer would expect in this context . . . Anaphoric demonstratives are used when reference tracking is somewhat problematic" (Diessel 1999.99).

45 I classify the ὁ pronoun as recognitional.

δέξαι στεφάνωμα τόδ' ἐκ Πυθῶνος εὐδόξῳ Μίδᾳ
αὐτόν τέ νιν Ἑλλάδα νικάσαντα τέχνᾳ, τάν ποτε . . .

Receive this crown from Pytho offered by famous
Midas,
and welcome the man himself, who defeated Hellas in
the art which . . .

After a first deictic focus on the crown (τόδ', "this present") exophorically indicated, the next (different) focus is on the victor Midas. As an anaphoric deixis of identity, αὐτός marks a shift in the focus of attention: it activates the mental representation of the agent of the victory (cf. νικάσαντα). The nearby νιν, a non-deictic anaphora referring to the same subject, is indeed not enough; it has no pragmatic force. Finally, τάν ποτε (hidden deixis, as we will see later on) reactivates the audience's knowledge of the mythical past, with the pronoun initiating the mythical section. Another passage with pragmatic deictic richness throughout is *Pythian* 4.67–69:

ἀπὸ δ' αὐτὸν ἐγὼ Μοίσαισι δώσω
καὶ τὸ πάγχρυσον νάκος κριοῦ· μετὰ γάρ
κεῖνο πλευσάντων Μινυᾶν, θεόπομποί σφισιν τιμαὶ
φύτευθεν.

And for my part, I shall entrust to the Muses
both him and the all-golden fleece of the ram, for when
the Minyai sailed in quest of it, god-sent honors were
planted for them.

Here αὐτόν (the victor Arcesilas, mentioned in v. 65) is deictically focused and deictically related to the praising "I"; τὸ, as we will see, activates the knowledge shared by the audience about the golden fleece; κεῖνο clarifies the next focus of attention, i.e., the golden fleece itself, visualized together with the (famous) expedition; and finally σφισιν, as a non-deictic pronoun, refers to the Minyan people, confirming its non-pragmatic relevance.

The specific deictic localizing function of each anaphoric demonstrative is of obvious importance. οὗτος refers to something somehow close to the performance situation, data either just mentioned or situational in the "you"-sphere. κεῖνος refers to something made present though far from the utterance situation, and αὐτός (conversely) to something far from the utterance

situation but made close to the speaker through the clearly recognizable identity of its referent.[46] Frequently used as pronouns and a few times as adjectives,[47] κεῖνος and αὐτός are considered deictic: they convey a deictic intention that points to an attentional status "in focus."[48] This differentiates them from other non-deictic or non-demonstrative pronouns. All demonstratives in the form of adjectives (ὅδε, οὗτος, κεῖνος, αὐτός), plus ὅδε and οὗτος as pronouns, reveal in their endophoric uses a strong dependence on "exophoric" realities, although the reference appears only co-textual. An example of an endophoric use that also ambiguously implies an exophoric use is, in my view, *Olympian* 6.8: ἴστω γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ πεδίλῳ δαιμόνιον πόδ᾽ ἔχων / Σωστράτου υἱός, "Let the son of Sostratos be assured that he has his blessed foot in such a sandal." ἐν τούτῳ πεδίλῳ is a strategic expression, since the contextualization of the "lucky position" occupied by the victor (Sostratos's son) combines the symbolic (metonymic) value of "sandal," peculiar to a proverbial expression ("to be in such a condition"), and a real, exophoric reference to the sandals of the current dance (as a further metaphor of the current song).[49] In Bühler's terms, the "pointing field" overlaps with the "symbol field."[50]

Recognitional demonstratives are, in Diessel, only adnominal and "are specifically used to mark information that is discourse new (i.e., unactivated) and hearer old (i.e., pragmatically supposed). More precisely, recognitional demonstratives mark information that is (1) discourse new, (2) hearer old, *and* (3) "private . . . Private information is information that

46 On the general semantic meaning of αὐτός, cf. Humbert 1960 [1945].34, Sadoulet 1984.62, Taillardat 1987.82–86. On αὐτῷ in *Is.* 6.39, cf. Bonifazi 2001.178–79. The pragmatic demonstrative function of αὐτός in archaic lyric should be more deeply investigated.

47 Significantly, ὅδε and οὗτος, usually exophoric, are employed mostly as adjectives, seldom as pronouns (ὅδε: 8 out of 50; οὗτος: 28 out of 83); conversely, κεῖνος and αὐτός, often endophoric, are employed mostly as pronouns, seldom as adjectives (κεῖνος: 13 out of 65; αὐτός: 13 out of 72).

48 Status "in focus" corresponds to "referents immediately accessible to the interlocutors through the 'cognitive window' on the current discourse which this section of working memory represents" (Cornish 1999.255).

49 On this passage and on the pragmatics of the song's metaphors, see Bonifazi 2001.82–83 and 115.

50 Translation by Bosch 1983.9 of the original terms "Zeigfeld" and "Symbolfeld," respectively (Bühler 1965 [1934], ch. 2). In pointing words, a positional mark is associated with the semantic sign of the expression: its representation provides a location in either real or imaginative space.

speaker and hearer share due to common experience in the past."[51] This pragmatic use can be related to Slater's "demonstrative" ὁ pronouns, ὁ definite articles, and ὁ/ὅς relative pronouns introducing mythical narratives.

Definite articles in epinician odes are not exophoric because they do not have a deictic value for localizing their referents, nor are they anaphoric, because they represent something discourse new. Finally, they indicate not general common knowledge about something or someone (like nouns without articles), but a specific shared knowledge, "private," contextual, and related to a specific audience in a specific performance situation. Different positions and/or syntactic roles for the ὁ article[52]—I suggest—do not contradict this basic communicative property. The first of two examples illustrating two different roles is *Olympian* 1.28–29:

> ἡ θαύματα πολλά, καί πού τι καὶ βροτῶν
> φάτις ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀλαθῆ λόγον
> δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.
>
> Yes, wonders are many, but then, too, I think, in men's talk
> stories are embellished beyond the true account
> and deceive by means of elaborate lies.

One might think that τὸν firmly links λόγον to "true," ἀλαθῆ, but actually λόγος in Pindar appears several times preceded by a qualifying adjective and without an article.[53] In perhaps its only other occurrence with an article (*Py.* 1.35–36: ὁ δὲ λόγος . . . δόξαν φέρει),[54] ὁ δὲ λόγος is clearly connected

---

51 Cf. Diessel 1999.106, who gives two examples: "I couldn't sleep last night. That dog kept me awake"; "I joined the navy for two years." The term "recognitional" is not new, but Himmelmann 1996.230–39 provides the first systematic account of this use. Cf. Diessel 1999.105.

52 Hummel 1993.178–87 keeps distinct the definite and syntactic functions. Slater 1969a.370 underscores that, in the cases of distance between the article and the related noun, the usage is "almost demonstrative." (This is equivalent to assigning to these articles a focus function on the basis of Devine and Stephens 2000.482–84.) Hummel 1993.183 identifies the function of the article in Pindaric epithets as a "'déictique' de notoriété," a use that is not far from our recognitional one.

53 As in the following occurrences: *Ol.* 7.21, *Py.* 1.68, *Py.* 7.9, *Ne.* 5.29, *Is.* 9.1, *Is.* 5.13, *Ol.* 10.11, *Ne.* 3.68, *Ne.* 7.32, *Ol.* 2.92, *Ol.* 6.90 (with the same adjective: ἀλαθέσιν λόγοις), *Py.* 4.101 and 128, *Ne.* 5.32, *Ne.* 11.17.

54 λόγος with an article occurs altogether four times: *Ol.* 1.28 (quoted), *Py.* 1.35 (quoted), and frags. 180.1 and 3. Unfortunately, the latter two occurrences are difficult to evaluate because of the missing context.

to the famous future of the city (Aetna) because of its crowns and its feasts.[55] *Olympian* 1.28 can also be related to a special "true discourse" that Pindar does not identify explicitly. This is a case of recognitional use: the article indicates "private" knowledge shared by the poet and the audience, even if not explicitly expressed. The second example is *Olympian* 14.19: ἁ Μινύεια, "the land of the Minyai." The locution indicates the city of Orchomenos, whose prehistoric inhabitants were the Minyans, as we know from *Il*. 2.511; ἁ conveys pragmatically "private" mythical knowledge about the city shared by the current inhabitants, plausibly the original recipients of *Olympian* 14, the short hymn to the Graces. Definite articles in all archaic lyric texts should probably be considered anew; since they are not so frequent, their occurrence is marked.[56] It should be possible to identify their pragmatic effectiveness, i.e., the communicative reason for their presence.

In summary, exophoric uses of deixis in Pindar are both gestural and symbolic. In turn, gestural uses include both the ocular and the *am Phantasma*. Discourse deictics convey exophoric and endophoric references simultaneously. Endophoric anaphoric uses reactivate mental representations anaphorically or cataphorically. Finally, endophoric recognitional uses reactivate private shared knowledge. With respect to recent and less recent debates about indexicals in Pindar, this classification considers deixis *am Phantasma* not as symbolic but as gestural in order to take into account "I" deixis as always anchored to its exophoric utterance situation even in its problematic extension, to see discourse deictics as both co-textual and performative references, to think of anaphoric demonstratives with their cognitive implications, namely, according to the mental representations being activated by them, and, finally, to unify definite articles and relative pronouns introducing mythical narratives under the same category, that of recognitional demonstratives.

Generally speaking, deixis in Pindar is, paradoxically, a way to disambiguate that is full of ambiguity. Interpretive problems related to Pindaric deixis arise from different kinds of overlap among these many uses. These include the already discussed extension possibilities of ocular indexicals and the unclear borderline between the ocular and the *am Phantasma* and

---

55 Gentili translates ὁ δὲ λόγος as "Il mio discorso" (Gentili et al. 1995.31).

56 Hummel 1993.177 quotes the statistics of M. Nöthiger (*Die Sprache des Stesichorus und des Ibycus*, 1971.119) on the percentage of articles in lyric and concludes: "l'emploi de l'article est donc fréquemment marqué."

between exophoric and endophoric sources of representations and perceptions. Another overlap is between recognitional and *am Phantasma* uses. These overlaps make it often impossible to assign each deictic expression unequivocally to one category or subcategory.

For the "then and there" audiences, perception of these overlaps was not a problem at all. Whenever it would have been useful to disambiguate their meanings, they could do so; whenever it would have been more meaningful not to disambiguate, they would not. The variation itself between disambiguating and not disambiguating would have been positively recognized through the comprehension of deictics, as part of an inferential activity highly influenced by shared knowledge.

THE CASE OF ΚΕΙΝΟΣ

κεῖνος represents an interesting pragmatic mix as an example of polyvalent deixis. Its general use is catalogued according to three basic notions: κεῖνος is always anaphoric; within the anaphoric, it can be a demonstrative of the far, of the "well known" in a good as well as in a bad sense, or simply a "third-person" pronoun (see Havers 1906, esp. 1–16 on *Jener-Deixis*). As far as Pindar is concerned, there is further information about its cataphoric use, its reference to the "well known" only in the positive direction of venerability, its more frequent use as a pronoun than in Homer, its equivalence to τοιοῦτος in some cases, and a vague indication of emphasis (cf. Des Places 1947.65–68, Slater 1969a.273–74, Hummel 1993.189).

It is true that κεῖνος usually presents someone or, less frequently, something as already mentioned before. Yet κεῖνος cataphoric proves its effectiveness beyond a capacity to retrieve old information; mental representations also work well in anticipatory deixis.[57] Furthermore, more than one passage in which the κεῖνος referent is close by, contradicts the traditional "far" mark applied to the anaphoric distance from κεῖνος-antecedents (Havers's *Fernanaphora*) in Pindar.[58] Finally, as we have seen, "third-person" pronouns reveal different levels of demonstrativity. Only forms like

---

57 Cf. *Py.* 4.19, frag. 94b.16, and *Ol.* 8.62; the anticipatory function is indirectly accepted at *Ne.* 5.22, where κεῖνος refers to Peleus and Thetis, and *Ne.* 8.23, where κεῖνος has Odysseus as its referent (cf. Bonifazi [in print]).

58 Cf. *Ne.* 10.62 (antecedent at 61), *Py.* 4.121ff. (antecedent at 123), *Ne.* 6.17 (antecedent at 15), *Py.* 9.123 (antecedent in the same line), *Is.* 1.15 (antecedent at 14).

νιν (μιν) and σφε are non-deictic "third-person" pronouns; the others have their own demonstrative value associated with the anaphoric (or cataphoric) function. At the time of Pindar's performances, this demonstrative value had not yet weakened.

The emphasis conveyed by κεῖνος has a pragmatic origin, associated with the specific deictic role of its utterance with respect to both the orienting and the localizing function. κεῖνος conveys visual deictic information about persons, objects, or events. The main goal of its utterance is not simply to localize somebody or something far from the "I"-sphere, but to make them visually present to the eyes of the performer(s) and the audience. This function comes from the particle **ke*, which adds to the notion of simple "far" (**eno-*) the fact that this far thing/person (suddenly) becomes close, present to the eyes of the utterer.[59] The κεῖνος utterance implies an added speech-act qualifying its deictic purpose: "Look! Here he (she/it) is! Do you see him (her/it)?" Pindar exploits this word to generate three different involvement strategies: a gestural strategy focusing on mythical characters or objects visualized during the narrative; a second gestural strategy focusing on persons or objects somehow involved in the visual present of the praise by "I" speech-acts; and finally, a politeness strategy (cf. Bonifazi 2001.24–26) indicating—mostly indirectly—someone at risk of blame, either rightly to be punished for his deeds, or, conversely, to be rescued from blame through Pindaric words.[60] An example of κεῖνος in mythical narratives is *Isthmian* 1.15–17:

ἐθέλω
ἢ Καστορείῳ ἢ Ἰολάοι᾽ ἐναρμόξαι νιν ὕμνῳ.
κεῖνοι γὰρ ἡρώων διφρηλάται Λακεδαίμονι καὶ
θήβαις ἐτέκνωθεν κράτιστοι·

I wish
to include him in a hymn to Kastor or Iolaos,
for they were the mightiest charioteers of the heroes,
one born in Lakedaimon, the other in Thebes.

---

59 The etymology of **ke-* as "I"-deixis is not controversial; cf. Havers 1906.4 and 94ff., Schwyzer 1969.1.613, Pokorny 1959.609, Chantraine 1968.329, Adrados 1975.820.

60 Politeness is a technical term for a whole branch of pragmatics, to be explored also by those who study Pindaric language.

An example of κεῖνος in the present time of the praise is *Isthmian* 4.43–44: προφρόνων Μοισᾶν τύχοιμεν, κεῖνον ἄψαι πυρσὸν ὕμνων / καὶ Μελίσσῳ, "May I find the favor of the Muses to light such a beacon-fire of hymns for Melissos too." Finally, an example of κεῖνος in a blame situation is *Nemean* 5.22–23:

> πρόφρων δὲ καὶ κείνοις ἄειδ' ἐν Παλίῳ
> Μοισᾶν ὁ κάλλιστος χορός
>
> Gladly did that fairest chorus of the Muses
> sing for those men on Pelion[61]

From the current theoretical point of view, κεῖνος is always endophoric, mostly anaphoric, sometimes cataphoric, never discourse deictic nor recognitional. Mental representations reactivated by that demonstrative result from a specific pragmatic intention of Pindar: to bring close to the eyes a distant reality. Thus endophoric κεῖνος is used according to exophoric modalities, both gestural ocular and gestural *am Phantasma*.

κεῖνος utterances become a cornerstone of the most important speech-acts of the poet: to praise well-known persons (in the present as well as in the past), even those politely (i.e., not explicitly) involved in a blame situation. It is quite remarkable that κεῖνος utterances convey the (autoreferential) power of polyvalent indications, which all draw their effectiveness from the visual, extralinguistic experience of performance spectators, either in imaginative, real, or social indexicality.

HIDDEN DEIXIS

Unlike the definite article, which is adnominal, ὁ-demonstrative is pronominal. Even in this function, it reactivates private shared knowledge.[62] Its closeness to the article and its "hybrid" status between pure anaphoric (as

---

61 The blame-nuance comes from the allusion to the improper killing of Phocus by Peleus and Telamon (*Ne.* 5.16–18). The κεῖνος reference is controversial: for some scholars, it is anaphoric (referring to Peleus and Telamon), for others, cataphoric (referring to Peleus and Thetis), and for others still, the referents, as in a vision, are completely "extra"-ode, e.g., Cadmus and Harmonia. A more extensive analysis of Pindar's use of κεῖνος is to be found in Bonifazi (in print).

62 In Diessel 1999.105, recognitional use is restricted to adnominal demonstratives.

pronoun) and weak demonstrative arise for a specific pragmatic reason.[63] ὁ-demonstrative in Slater's list does not refer simply to an antecedent or a "subsequent"; nor does it localize a person or an object in an extralinguistic place or time.[64] ὁ conveys a deictic intention, since it orients the understander toward a pointed-out entity. Its pragmatic function is to reactivate private shared knowledge about somebody or something not simply already mentioned, "hearer old," but also well known. ὁ-demonstrative pronouns refer to both the present and the past. The former is infrequent; it restricts the range of reference, and often we cannot define the exact prior referents. Like definite articles, these pronouns convey the same restricted—for us indecipherable—knowledge. For example, the "polar expression"[65] at *Pythian* 5.55: ὁ Βάττου δ' ἔπεται παλαιὸς ὄλβος ἔμπαν τὰ καὶ τὰ νέμων, "But the ancient prosperity of Battos continues, nevertheless, as it bestows now this, now that," is intelligible, but its definite referents, even if somehow deictically pointed out, remain basically vague.[66] Our inability to assign a specific referent to ὁ should not preclude our accepting the existence of a specific pragmatic use. The second kind of ὁ-demonstrative, referring to the past, always has clear antecedents: in 108 of the 134 occurrences in epinicia, in mythical narratives or in the present, it refers to a reality (a character, an event) belonging to a well-known past. For example, at *Nemean* 3.50: τὸν ἐθάμβεον Ἄρτεμίς τε καὶ θρασεῖ' Ἀθάνα, "Artemis and bold Athena marveled to see him," τὸν refers to Achilles, as the univocal focus of actions narrated in the previous lines (43–49, the whole strophe).

For Homeric language, Bakker 1999a.6 identifies ὁ as the "demonstrative of the far, of narrative." Through its utterance, especially if followed by δέ, audience attention is drawn forward to the actions and subjects accompanying it.[67] In Pindar, too, various particles that normally follow ὁ

63 Humbert 1960 [1945].35 calls it "preséntatif." On definite articles in Pindar, see Slater 1969a.359 ("where ὁ is not followed by a particle, is it often impossible to decide whether the use is relative or demonstrative") and Des Places 1947.37ff.

64 Slater 1969a.364–68 collects ὁ, ὅ, and ὅς occurrences and gives three general uses: relative, demonstrative, and articular (according to the distinction made by Ullmann 1922.59ff.). I propose to consider as recognitional all demonstrative occurrences of ὁ.

65 Cf. Stoneman 1997.150. Very often ὁ referring to the present appears in disjunctive expressions.

66 The different possible interpretations of τὰ, καὶ τὰ *et similia* (cf., for example, Race 1983 and Giannini 1994 on *Py.* 5.55) give room for uncertainty of meaning—for us, of course.

67 Pronouns such as ὁ δὲ participate in the Homeric "syntax of movement" analyzed by Bakker 1997b.62–71.

have an important pragmatic function, helping listeners to understand in what sense the meaning was to be restricted (cf. Slater 1969a.364–66). ὁ-demonstrative pronouns indicate knowledge shared by the poet and audience regarding figures and events of the mythical past. Their private character depends on the collective memory of the performance participants, that is, in Bara's terms, on the number of shared, not only common beliefs.

Relative pronouns introducing mythical sections share the same pragmatic properties as the ὁ-demonstrative pronoun. The only difference is that relative pronouns, while remaining anaphoric—literally "relative"—also represent a syntactic link to the persons or objects just mentioned. In *Nemean* 9.11: ὃς τότε μὲν βασιλεύων κεῖθι, "Who, reigning there at that time," ὃς refers to Adrastos (v. 9), as the poet begins to remember the facts about him and the expedition of the Seven against Thebes. Through the reactivation of the mythical character Adrastos, the listener can make him present to his own mind. Thus the boundary between the endophoric recognitional use and the exophoric *am Phantasma* use collapses—another overlap to take into account. According to my own investigation of these features (Bonifazi [forthcoming]), the coexistence of ὁ and ὅς forms (respectively **so-/to-* and **yo-* IE roots) proves an isolating function, which is implied by their archaic meanings. The reactivated knowledge of the past enacts a change of register in the performance. Every time a relative pronoun followed by an aorist verb introduces either a long or a short narrative about mythical events in archaic poetry,[68] a recognitional use is probably at play; to read it, we have to understand the communicative effects of this use in terms of the shared knowledge being recognized. Endophoric recognitional deixis is characterized less by its localizing than by its orienting function, which implies an additional speech-act, something like "You know what I am speaking about." The private knowledge reactivated is (mythical) past-oriented.

68 Among many occurrences in epic poetry and in lyric, I cite only *Il.* 1.2 and *Od.* 1.1. In these famous lines, relative pronouns (for Achilles' anger and for Odysseus, respectively) begin the whole mythical narrative of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The pervasive presence of aorists accompanying these pronouns could open another whole chapter on temporal deixis in Pindar, but, for the sake of brevity, I do not consider time deixis here. My view of Pindaric past-oriented pronouns supports Bakker 1997a and 1999b, who has investigated the pragmatic value of epic aorists in terms of cognitive reactivations.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that Pindaric epinician performance is always a communicative act, that deictic expressions correspond to speech-acts, and that deictic acts can be described according to their pragmatic uses. My classification of person and place deixis illustrates the interlacing of linguistic and extralinguistic phenomena; its aim is to focus on Pindaric deixis as a sophisticated and powerful tool of involvement.

Interpretive disadvantages or obstacles to our understanding of epinician deixis are, first of all, related to reference. Pindaric exegetes tend to interpret a deictic expression as only localizing a definite referent; consequently they misunderstand Pindaric deixis, for example, by trying to extract from it fixed geographical or individual data. But as we have seen, deixis is not a matter of data and reference. Another "classical" appreciation of deixis concerns its conventional use, derived basically from Bundy's fine remarks (Bundy 1986 [1962], esp. 1–7), which some take as nullifying any non-fictive implications.[69] But conventionality and genre pertinence do not exclude associated ad hoc references, nor, more importantly, impede their "felicity" or communicative efficacy at that moment of the performance.[70] Pindar is less interested in his audience's ability to identify x or y than in what he wants to *do* by indicating x or y. His ambiguity is always intentional, even in deictic utterances. For example, the polyvalent expression at *Olympian* 6.84, ματρομάτωρ ἐμὰ Στυμφαλίς ("My grandmother was Stymphalian"), foils our attempt to find a univocal "I"-reference (see Bonifazi 2001.130–33). But if Pindar had wanted to disambiguate the expression, certainly he would have done so.

More relevant than univocal localization is the involvement of the interpreter in inferential activity. Sometimes an expression is not grammatically deictic but expresses a deictic intention; some song metaphors, for example, have a strong link with a kind of *demonstratio* of the ongoing performance because of their allusions to external performance circumstances.[71] The borderline is not so clear between what is deictic and what is

---

69 Cf., for example, Anzai 1994.143–45 for an analysis of the so-called βάσις-language in Pindar ("formulaic" expressions like: ἔβαν, ἔλθον, etc.).

70 "Felicity" is the term used by Austin 1962 to indicate the communicative success of saying as doing.

71 ὕμνων θησαυρός (*Py.* 6.7/8), for example, clearly implies a *demonstratio* of the song, since its utterance was designed for a Delphi performance; cf. Shapiro 1988. On the Pindaric combination of metaphoric noun + ὕμνων or ἀοιδᾶν, see Bonifazi 2001.110–11.

not, nor between the different kinds of grammatical forms recognized as deixis. Finally, deictic expressions having explicit as well as implicit meanings appear ambiguous, if not obscure.

The pragmatic and cognitive information that we can deduce from my overview represents the positive side of the interpretative obstacles. What cognitive properties are revealed, then, by the pragmatic uses of deixis in Pindar? All deictic expressions activate or reactivate shared knowledge but at different levels: perceptional, in exophoric deixis; representational, in focusing on persons or objects already mentioned or to be mentioned in anaphoric (and cataphoric) deixis; autoreferential, concerning the ongoing performance speech-acts in discourse deixis; and, finally, social, in culturally shared meanings determined by articles and ὁ pronouns.

The two intentions of the poet—a basic orienting intention, corresponding to the speech-act of pointing at a referent, and an arranging, localizing intention, corresponding to the act of giving a place (in space or in time) to that referent—suggest a preoccupation with orienting more than localizing. Localizing aims not at identifying univocal, "unison" referents but at demonstrating the ability to orient audience eyes and ears ambiguously or "polyphonically." The different possibilities of overlap[72] show that deictic acts are more important than the deictic expressions themselves, as in the case of implicit speech-acts behind some indexicals. These include: κεῖνος, "Look! Here he is! Do you see him?"; οὗτος, "This one I just uttered (or am about to utter)"; and ὁ, "You know well what I am speaking about." Autoreferentiality arises, then, not only in the deictic references themselves, but also in the act of making deictic references.

A "classical" notion of grammar for ancient Greek literature, as Bakker proposes,[73] calls for cognitive extensions based on analyzing linguistic features that convey non-standard uses, implicit meanings, real speaker intentions, and reactivated shared knowledge. The Pindaric ode is a compact, meaningful, highly literary product, but it is a mere linguistic trace of something much more articulate: its communicative effectiveness once went far beyond its verbal or linguistic realization. Its deictic system constitutes a

---

72 Very often when a deictic utterance indicates an object, a person, or the utterance itself, it simultaneously conveys other symbolic (extensional) or non-physical relationships. When it indicates a symbolic or non-physical presence, i.e., in the memory or fantasy of the audience, it conveys at the same time physical, and mainly visual, relationships.

73 The essence of the anthology *Grammar as Interpretation* is "the shift in interest from the 'what' to the 'how' in the production of meaning" (Bakker 1997c.1).

linguistic sub-code of various shared contexts and of associated shared meanings, including the symbolic ones. The pervasive deictic features are frequently grouped together and are always poetically significant. Although this fact does not help us decipher real data, it is a precious resource of epinician poetics. Inferential and involvement strategies activated by Pindar contribute autoreferentially to the *demonstratio* of the power of his song.

I return to my initial framework for epinician communication (above, p. 392–93). Pindaric deictic practices require a strong contribution from "external" data (both linguistic pragmatic, and extralinguistic) in order to understand linguistic forms of deixis, even those linked to the "internal" text.[74] By means of indexicals, such extraliteral meanings and the extra-linguistic realization of the performance somehow dominate. This imbalance between linguistic and extralinguistic text processing probably affected the cognitive activity of original listeners. The ways modern interpreters can be affected by the same imbalance are what I have tried to highlight in this article, through a shift of focus from grammatical to usage meanings, from textual references to mental representations, and from involvement by specification to involvement by ambiguity.[75]

Center for Hellenic Studies

74 I spoke, for example, of *demonstratio ad aures* for discourse deictics.

75 Special thanks to Nancy Felson for a thorough reading of the draft of this paper and to Egbert Bakker for his encouragement. Furthermore, I am grateful to the CHS and to the wonderful environment I enjoyed there as a 2002–2003 Junior Fellow.